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Monetary Policy in Tanzania
Accomplishments and the Road Ahead
Pantaleo J. Kessy, Johnson Nyella, and Stephen A. O'Connell

The reserve-money programming framework that has successfully guided
monetary policy in Tanzania over the past two decades is on the cusp of what
is arguably its first major change—a transition from monetary aggregates to
interest rates as the operational target of policy, in the context of taking on
many of the core elements of inflation targeting. We focus in this chapter on
the road ahead and the issues the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) will confront as it
makes this transition. Our focus throughout will be on the conduct of national
monetary policy, noting that the BoT's direction of travel is fully consistent
with the convergence process towards East African Monetary Union.
Our central argument is that the BoT is continuing to evolve towards a
modem system of what Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) called constrained
discretion, in which monetary policy provides a strong anchor for inflation
expectations while also performing a role in stabilizing the real economy. We
will argue that a clearer focus on interest rates can improve the transparency of
policy and strengthen the BoT's leverage over inflation—and also that it can
enhance the development of the financial sector, a key secondary objective of
monetary policy in Tanzania. We begin, however, with the origins of the
current system and the sources of its success to date.

11.1 The Monetary/Fiscal Accord of the Mid-1990s
The current framework for monetary policy dates from the fiscal and legislative
reforms of the mid-1990s. By the early 1990s, a decade of market-based reforms
had restored the role of market prices throughout the economy, including the
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exchange rate and interest rates (Chapter 2, this volume). Exchange controls
had been eliminated for current account transactions, privatization of the
banking sector was underway, and the government bond market was being
developed. A situation of fiscal dominance nonetheless persisted, in which the
banking system and the central bank were obliged to finance any public-sector
spending not covered by tax revenues or foreign grants. Domestic financing
therefore ballooned when the government's commitment to revenue mobil
ization and expenditure control slackened in the early 1990s and conflict with
external donors emerged (Mpango, 2002).
The Bank of Tanzania was operating at that time under the 1978 Amend
ments to the Bank of Tanzania Act, which obliged the Bank to support the
development priorities of the government (Appendix Table llA.l shows the
relevant provisions). Market-based reforms and privatization of the banking
system had allowed the BoT to retreat from the wide range of quasi-fiscal roles
it had assumed in the long wake of the Amsha Declaration,^ but the BoT
arguably had neither the mandate nor the political independence in the
early 1990s to contain inflation in the face of large fiscal deficits. To do so
would have required holding back overall money growth, which would have
required a sharp and costly contraction in bank lending to the private sector.
What was needed to bring down inflation at a tolerable cost to the economy—
and to open the space for a monetary policy capable of delivering price
stability on an ongoing basis—^was an accord that would lock in fiscal discip
line in the near term while placing the BoT at arm's length from future
demands for excessive monetary finance.
The key elements of the accord that emerged in Tanzania in the mid-1990s
were an explicit acknowledgment, at the highest levels of government, that
inflation was being driven by the monetary finance of fiscal deficits; an
International Monetary Fund (IMF)-supported agreement that directly pre
vented monetary finance by imposing a monthly cash budget on the spend
ing ministries; and a new Bank of Tanzania Act (1995) that bolstered the
institutional independence of the BoT.^
Section 5.3 of the BoT Act of 1995 elevated price stability to unambiguous
status as the chief objective of monetary policy in Tanzania. The increased
clarity that this conferred may have made little difference at first to the disin
flation that got underway in 1995/96; and on paper, the BoT's capability to
pursue its mandate appeared to be undermined by a passage in the 1995 Act—
never activated, and eliminated in the Bank of Tanzania Act of 2006—that
authorized the Minister of Finance to conduct monetary policy unilaterally for
a period of up to a year in the event of 'irreconcilable disagreement' with the
Board of the Central Bank (see Appendix Table llA.l). But the cost of that
disinflation to the aggregate real economy—looking at Figure 11.1—appears to
have been extremely mild. By comparison with the growth that was taking
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Real GDP growth and inflation in Tanzania
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Grey lines show average growth and median inflation for 114 emerging/developing countries.

Figure 11.1. Inflation and growth in Tanzania, 1984/85-2014/15
Source: BoT and IMF October 2015 World Economic Outlook database online.

place in other developing countries, Tanzania's cost was centred in 1996/97,
when growth was unchanged in Tanzania while it rose in other countries, and
completely absent by 1997/98, when Tanzania's GDP growth rate did fall by a
small amount, but by less than that in the rest of the developing world.
The buoyancy of Tanzania's real economy in the face of a concerted moneybased disinflation is at odds with the typical experience in emerging-market
economies, where stabilizations accomplished through tight monetary policy
have been associated with a demand-driven recession as high interest rates
take a toll on aggregate demand (Calvo and Vegh, 1999). Tanzania's milder
experience may reflect the prevalence of flexible prices in Tanzania's large
agricultural and urban informal sectors, along with the impact of direct gov
ernment controls over some influential prices (e.g., for public utilities) and
wages (e.g., in the public sector)—these factors may have facilitated rapid
disinflation without requiring a major contraction in aggregate demand.
Stmctural reforms helped to reduce inflationary pressures from the supply
side (Chapter 2, this volume), and donor inflows softened the underlying
fiscal adjustment. But the low aggregate cost of Tanzania's disinflation is also
consistent with a favourable credibility effect. In this interpretation, partici
pants in the economy interpreted the multifaceted accord as a durable change
in the fiscal and monetary policy regime, and adjusted their inflationary
243
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expectations accordingly. This adjustment in expectations allowed inflation
to fall without requiring a sharp economic contraction (Sargent, 1982).

11.2 Reserve-Money Programming since 1995
The operational legacy of the mid-90s accord, in terms of BoT practice, was the
reserve-money-targeting framework that has governed the conduct of monet
ary policy over the two subsequent decades. The hallmark of this framework is
a set of monthly ceilings for the growth in reserve money that are derived from
the inflation and growth targets in the government's annual budget.
Three main considerations favored the choice of reserve-money targeting in
Tanzania, both during the disinflation episode and after inflation had fallen
into the 5 per cent range by the late 1990s (Figure 11.1).^ The first was that any
framework for price stability needs a nominal anchor, and restoring the fixedexchange rate system for this purpose was out of the question. The government
was committed to a market-determined exchange rate, having laboured over
much of the previous decade to dismantle the highly distorting exchangecontrol regime that had emerged from the balance-of-payments crises of the
1970s. So the system would need a different nominal anchor.
Inflation itself had emerged as a possible nominal anchor in the formal
inflation-targeting (IT) system introduced by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
in 1989. The Reserve Bank's framework combined an explicit numerical
range for inflation with new standards of communication, transparency,
and independence in central bank practice. But as of the mid-1990s, IT was
regarded as an option limited to countries with well-developed financial
markets and high-quality data, and with established traditions of fiscal dis
cipline. The main alternative to the exchange rate among developing
countries—and the natural choice for the BoT—was the path of a broad
monetary aggregate like M2^
Given a monetary aggregate as nominal anchor, a second decisive feature
favoring reserve-money targeting was the mdimentary condition of Tanza
nian financial markets. In a well-developed financial market, a central bank
can pursue a broad monetary aggregate using either a short-term interest rate
or some variant of reserve money as its operating target.^ But interbank and
short-term government bond markets were in their infancy in Tanzania in the
1990s, and large parts of the mral economy continued to operate mainly on
currency. The interest-rate option was therefore unrealistic. It is only recently
that the option of setting a target for a short-term interest rate, and relying on
financial markets to translate the BoT's target into economy-wide lending
conditions and the exchange rate and other key asset prices, has become
potentially viable.
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A final and non-trivial consideration in favour of reserve-money targeting
grew out of its distinctive role in accomplishing the disinflation. The central
focus of reforms and IMF conditionality was ending the monetary finance of
fiscal deficits. The BoT had been providing this finance through its accumula
tion of government securities, other advances to government, and loans to
commercial banks that could be on-lent to public entities. A sequence of
explicit ceilings on the BoT's net domestic assets, implemented with high
transparency via the cash budget and specified as IMF programme conditions,
therefore played a key role in the disinflation strategy. In the context of a
flexible exchange rate and a sequence of separate targets for the BoT's inter
national reserves (the main component of the BoT's net foreign assets), these
ceilings implied a target path for the sum of the BoT's net domestic assets and
net foreign assets—in effect, for the size of the BoT's overall balance sheet. By
the balance-sheet identity, this in turn meant a target path for the BoT's main
liability, reserve money. Targets for reserve money therefore played a key role
during the disinflation episode, simultaneously providing a nominal anchor
for inflation and supporting an accord that very clearly and publicly distanced
the BoT from fiscal pressures.
By the late 1990s, the success of the disinflation was clear and the question
of an appropriate monetary framework could in principle have been posed
anew. But the conditions emphasized in this section remained relevant,
including the commitment to exchange-rate flexibility, the thinness of
domestic financial markets, and the familiarity of the framework within the
context of an ongoing policy dialogue with the IMF. Added to these was the
basic suitability of the IMF's financial programming model to the data-poor
environment of the BoT.® Reserve-money programming was therefore a nat
ural choice for Tanzania even outside of a stabilization context, as it was
starting in the 1990s for many low-income countries transitioning away
from fixed exchange rates and developing the capacity to conduct an inde
pendent monetary policy (Berg etal., 2015).
Tanzania's system has been remarkably successful, as illustrated in
Figures 11.2a and 11.2b. The BoT's primary legislative mandate, dating from
the BoT Act of 1995, is to maintain 'price stability conducive to a balanced and
sustainable growth of the national economy of Tanzania'.'^ This objective
reflects the twofold principle that the ultimate aim of monetary policy is to
provide an environment conducive to favourable performance of the real
economy, and that the single most important contribution the central bank
can make to this goal is to achieve price stability, defined in practice as a
reasonably low and stable rate of inflation.® The BoT's mandate includes the
cmcial secondary objective, also grounded in the ultimate aim of balanced
and sustainable growth, of supporting the development and stability of the
financial sector (see Appendix Table llA.l).
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— Target —Actual
Grey line shows the unweighted average of GDP growth for 138
emerging/developing countries.

Figure 11.2a. Targeted and actual real GDP growth in Tanzania, 1995/96-2014/15
Source: BoT and IMF, April 2015 World Economic Outlook database online.

Figures 11.2a and 11.2b compare the performance of gross domestic product
(GDP) growth and consumer price index (CPI) inflation to the government's
annual fiscal-year targets for these variables. With the exception of 2008/09—
the inaugural year of the global financial crisis—the real economy has met or
out-performed the government's growth targets despite their rapid increase
from 4 per cent at the outset of the disinflation to roughly 7 per cent per year
by the late 1990s. By comparison with 138 other developing countries,
Tanzanian GDP growth has proven remarkably robust to the global shocks
of the post-2006 period, including the global food price shocks of 2006 and
2007, the global financial crisis, and the collapse of global commodity prices
(particularly energy) starting in 2011. Energy prices have a special status
their recent collapse has helped the Tanzanian economy while simultan
eously dampening the future prospects of the natural gas sector and serving
as an early warning of the volatility to which Tanzania will be exposed if it
becomes a major energy exporter.
The real-side accomplishments in Figure 11.2a provide indirect testimony to
the success of monetary policy since the mid-1990s—at the very least it has
apparently done little harm, unless substantially more ambitious growth
targets were appropriate for the period. A similarly favourable—but somewhat
more complex—story emerges in Figure 11.2b, which shows CPI inflation.
Following its rapid decline during the second half of the 1990s, headline
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---- Target

Headline inflation — Excl. Food & Energy

Target pertains to headline; see discussion in text.
Grey line shows median CPI inflation rate for 138 emerging/developing countries.

Figure 11.2b. Targeted and actual real CPI inflation in Tanzania, 1995/96-2014/15
Note-. From FY2011/2012 to FY2015/16 the Government’s inflation target has been stated as 'CPI
inflation in single digits.’ In the Figure we use 9.5% to denote this target. The BoT continues to
maintain an internal medium-term target of 5%.
Source: BoT and IMF, April 2015 World Economic Outlook database! online.

inflation has remained below 10 per cent in most years and within 5 points of
the median for 138 developing and emerging-market countries with the
exception of 2010 and 2011. Core inflation, which excludes food and energy
prices, has been even lower, remaining below 10 per cent since FY1996/97.®
Headline inflation has nonetheless remained above the BoT's 'medium-term
target' of 5 per cent since FY2004/05, and some dissonance has emerged
between this aspirational goal and the government's annual fiscal-year target,
which has been stated since 2011 as the less demanding 'inflation in single
digits'. As of 2014/15, however, inflation was once again under firm control,
approaching 5 per cent on a headline basis and well below that for core.

11.2.1 Implementing the Framework
Figure 11.3 provides a sense of reserve-money targeting in action. Annual
targets for the growth in reserve money are derived within the framework
directly from the government's growth and inflation targets shown in
Figures 11.2a and 11.2b. To show how, we need a bit of notation: we will use
P to denote the CPI, y to denote real GDP, M to denote the monetary aggregate
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----- RM growth upper bound —•— CPI inflation target + GDP Growth target
Dotted lines; RM growth targets for 1997/98 and 2015/16 are from Monetary Policy Statements.
All other RM growth rates are calculated using end-yr targets and end-previous-yr actual levels.

Figure 11.3. Fiscal-year reserve-money growth targets in Tanzania
Source: Bank of Tanzania.

that serves as the BoT's intermediate target (M2 or M3), and H to denote
reserve money, defined as the sum of currency in circulation and the
deposits of commercial banks at the BoT. The links between the targets are
then defined by two key empirical relationships within the monetary block of
the IMF's financial programming model. These are M • v = P • y, where v is the
velocity of the BoT's intermediate target; and M = ju. • H, where p. is the money
multiplier. Taken together, these relationships imply P • y = v • p • ff or, using
the notation ^(-) to denote a growth rate from one year to the next,
rT+g^g{H) + \g{v)+g{,j.)],

(11.1)

where we have used n = g{P) to denote the CPI inflation rate and g = g{y) to
denote the growth rate of real GDP.
Equation (11.1) provides a consistency framework that relates the growth rate
of reserve money to the growth rates of nominal income, velocity, and the
money multiplier. The fiscal-year budget adopted by Parliament includes the
inflation and real GDP growth targets for the year, which tie down ir + g. The BoT
then forecasts the growth rates of velocity and the money multiplier using a
combination of econometric modeling and expert judgement. This leaves g{H) as
the growth rate of reserve money that is consistent with the government's targets.
Holding the growth rates of velocity and the money multiplier constant
at their forecasted values—more on this in Sections 11.2.2 and 11.3.1—the
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Fiscal year (beginning July of indicated calendar year)
------ RM --------Nominal income

•

Velocity ------- Multiplier

Figure 11.4. Relation of reserve money growth to nominal income growth
Source: Bank of Tanzania.

reserve-money-targeting (RMT) framework incorporates a simple account
of what monetary economists call the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy, defined as the link between the operational targets directly under the
central bank's control and the ultimate economic outcomes the central bank
is seeking to influence. For given values of g{v) and g{fc), faster growth in
reserve money drives the growth of nominal income above the government's
implied target, with the split between higher n and higher^ determined by the
slope of the economy's short-run aggregate supply curve. To anchor inflation
at the targeted level, therefore, the growth of reserve money should not exceed
the value in equation (11.1).
Figure 11.3 plots the BoT's fiscal-year target for reserve-money growth
against the government's target for nominal income growth. Given the rela
tive stability of targeted nominal income growth, the wide amplitude of
fluctuations in programmed reserve-money growth was driven by large and
variable trends in velocity and the money multiplier (Adam and Kessy, 2011;
Adam et al., 2012). While the BoT was reasonably successful at extrapolating
ongoing trends over this period—Figure 11.4 shows the actual evolution of
the components of equation (11.1)—some portion of the large cumulative
decrease in velocity starting in the late 1990s was unanticipated, and led
to a combination of programme overshoots (see Figure 11.5) and interestrate volatility.
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11.2.2 Evidence of Flexibility in the Application of Reserve-Money Targeting
We emphasized in the previous subsection the hroad success of the reservemoney-targeting framework—first, at achieving disinflation, and subse
quently at providing an anchor for inflation expectations that was consistent
with rapid and stable growth of the real economy. Some portion of the latter
success may be due to an ongoing policy dialogue with the IMF that allowed
greater flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy than the rigid sequence of
target-setting exercises and programme reviews would appear to have allowed.
Table 11.1 provides some direct evidence on this point. We consider the
dynamic relationship between the monthly reserve-money ceilings that
were derived from semi-annual programme targets and the monthly actual
performance of reserve money. For each of the two variables—the logs of
target and actual reserve money—we estimate an error-correction model that
shows how the variable responded to the previous month's gap between
reserve money and the target. We include lags of both variables to control
for other features of the dynamics, and we estimate two versions of the model,
one in which the gap is simply defined by the difference between the logs of
reserve money and the target, and one in which we define an adjusted gap that
has a mean of zero over the full sample but has separate nonzero means before
and after July 2007.^°
Two suggestive findings stand out from this exercise. First, it is clear that
the framework operated to constrain monetary policy, as it was intended to
do. Gaps between reserve money and the ceiling generated policy adjustments
that altered reserve-money growth in a direction that would reduce the gap.
This is apparent in the negative and statistically significant coefficient on
the gap in columns 1 and 5. These adjustments are consistent with an inter
pretation of the gap as a slippage in policy that required—and produced—a
corrective adjustment in policy.
Second, however, the targets themselves also appear to have responded to the
lagged gap. This is not apparent in columns 2 and 6 where the gap enters
symmetrically, but Granger causality runs in both directions between these
variables, and when we allow for asymmetric responses—allowing targets to
adjust differently depending on whether reserve money is above or below the
ceiling—we find that adjustments in the target did play a systematic role in
responding to observed gaps (columns 4 and 8).^^ Strikingly, these adjustments
took place when the gap was positive. Their impact was therefore to partially
accommodate the 'excessive' reserve money growth that had taken place.^^
This evidence of accommodation has at least two possible interpretations,
with different implications for the ability of the system to anchor inflation
expectations. The first is that deviations from target were interpreted with
some regularity as appropriate responses by the BoT to new information about
250

Table 11.1. Responses to deviations from the reserve-money ceiling
Variable

Regressions with unadjusted gap
log(RM)

Cap(t-1)

-0.301***
-3.53
p=0.001

log(Ceiling)

Log(RM)

Regressions with adjusted gap
Log(Ceiling)

0.053
0.84
p=0.401

Gap > 0 (t-1)

-0.489***
-4.67
p=0.00
-0.134
-1.01
p=0.316
-0.514***
-3.28
p=0.001

Cap < 0 (t-1)

2
184
0.251

2
184
0.193

2
184
0.258

log(Ceiling)

2
184
0.215

-0.025
-0.68
p=0.497
2
184
0.285

Log(RM)

Log(Ceiling)

0.081
1.03
p=0.31

0.234**
2.40
p=0.018
-0.179
-1.56
p=0.120

Month=Jul 07
Lags
N
r2_a

log(RM)

-0.018
-0.65
p=0.519
2
184
0.192

-0.353**
-2.16
p=0.03
-0.607***
-4.00
p=0.00
-0.027
-0.73
p=0.468
2
184
0.285

0.298**
2.44
p=0.02
-0.108
-0.95
p=0.34
-0.021
-0.76
p=0.451
2
184
0.212

Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. t values are below the coefficient estimates.
The unadjusted gap is the difference between the log of reserve money and the log of the reserve-money ceiling. The adjusted gap is the residual from a regression of the unadjusted gap on a
constant and a dummy variable that equals 1 starting in July 2007 and zero otherwise. Monthly data are from the Bank of Tanzania.

Pantaleo J. Kessy et al.

the state of the economy—in other words, as appropriate monetary policy
decisions that should not be reversed in the absence of even newer informa
tion. For example, reserve money growth might have exceeded targets because
the BoT observed that money demand was rising faster, and therefore velocity
falling faster, than was predicted when the targets for reserve-money growth
were set. Allowing reserve money to exceed the targets was perfectly appro
priate in such a situation, and would have been non-inflationary; in fact, a
policy of forcing reserve-money growth back to pre-existing programme tar
gets would have created an unnecessary contraction in credit conditions and
the real economy.
The other interpretation is that the system was unwilling to absorb the
political costs of correcting episodes of over-expansionary policy, and was
therefore subject to a degree of inflation bias despite the presence of the IMF
as an external monitor. Headline inflation does appear to be less well
anchored after 2005 than before (Figure 11.5 shows the gap between headline
inflation and the BoT's own medium-term target of 5 per cent). But some
portion of this is driven by adverse supply shocks originating in Tanzania's
large food-production sector and world energy markets. Figure 11.2b shows
core inflation, which excludes food and energy prices and is often viewed as a
more accurate proxy for expected inflation than headline inflation. Core
inflation remains below headline over most of the period since 2005. This is

Figure 11.5. Reserve-money targeting in Tanzania
Source: Bank of Tanzania.
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consistent with a policy that allowed headline inflation to reflect the firstround effects of supply shocks, while seeking to limit the transmission of these
shocks into expectations and core inflation.^'* Figure 11.5 also shows the BoT's
tendency to mn reserve-money growth below targets after 2007, suggesting a
real-time response to inflation developments that suggested faster-thananticipated growth in velocity (equation (11.1)). Our own interpretation of
Table 11.1 therefore leans more heavily on the first explanation—the argu
ment that reserve-money targeting, as actually practiced in Tanzania, reflected
a collaborative dialogue with the IMF that allowed an otherwise relatively rigid
framework to achieve some desirable degree of flexibility in practice. Elements
of both explanations may of course be present.

11.3 Practical Challenges: Portfolio Shocks, Policy
Transmission, and Financial Development
Bemanke and Mishkin (1997) use the term constrained discretion to describe a
monetary policy that provides a strong anchor for inflation while also acting
to stabilize the real economy. To anchor inflation successfully, the monetary
authority must be genuinely constrained by its price stability mandate, in the
sense of being willing to take corrective policy action to bring inflation into
line even when doing so is costly. Its commitment to doing so must be
communicated to the public and demonstrated in action, because actual
inflation depends on expectations of inflation. But if inflation expectations
are anchored in this sense, then the monetary authority also has scope to
improve the performance of the real economy by counteracting costly fluctu
ations in aggregate demand over the business cycle.
We have argued that the success of RMT in Tanzania reflects elements of
both constraint and discretion. Despite its success, however, RMT has three
emerging limitations at this stage in Tanzania's development. The first is its
vulnerability to shocks to velocity and the money multiplier. This vulnerabil
ity is a familiar property of systems that target monetary aggregates, and when
other considerations favour a flexible exchange rate as in Tanzania, it is
generally thought to favour a policy rate system, where inflation serves as the
intermediate target and a short-term interest rate serves as the operational
target. Much of modem monetary economics is built around the analysis of
such systems. The second limitation of RMT is its relative lack of transparency,
a potentially serious weakness when monetary policy is largely about the
management of private-sector expectations.
The third limitation of RMT is more speculative, and relates to the two-way
relationship between the BoT's policy framework and financial development
in Tanzania. We will argue that even in the absence of fiscal dominance.
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monetary policy in low-income countries may be subject to a subtle but
challenging trap, where in the short run poorly-developed financial markets
favor a policy framework that relies for its effectiveness on quantity targets
and direct interventions—but where these interventions then create a barrier
to the long-run development of a financial sector that is competitive and
inclusive enough to support strong transmission of the central bank's policy
rate throughout the economy.
A policy rate system has advantages in dealing with each of these chal
lenges. Other combinations of operational and intermediate targets are
possible—for example, targeting inflation but using reserve money as the
operating target (as the Bank of Mexico has done for extended periods) or
targeting broad money but using a short-term interest rate as the operating
target (as the US Fed did during episodes in the 1970s). And Tanzania's RMT
framework is itself under constant internal review to improve its operating
characteristics.^^ In our view, however, the appropriate direction of travel is
clear: towards a policy rate system in which the role of monetary aggregates is
de-emphasized and a short-term interest rate is used to target inflation and
communicate the stance of policy.

11.3.1 Accommodating Portfolio Shocks
The most obvious shortcoming of RMT is its tendency to produce interest-rate
volatility in the presence of unforeseen shocks to velocity or the money multi
plier. Figure 11.6 illustrates this point analytically, focusing on the interbank
market for liquidity in the form of deposits at the BoT.^® The Figure illustrates
the market for overnight interbank loans, where banks that are short of liquidity
can borrow at the interbank call money rate Ubcm from banks with liquidity
to spare.
The downward-sloping line in Figure 11.6 shows the net demand for liquid
ity by all banks taken together. The position of this curve reflects all of the
determinants of bank demand, including the public's preference for currency
versus demand deposits, the stringency of legal reserve requirements, and the
eagerness of banks to lend. But it also depends on the overall supply of
commercial bank deposits at the BoT. The BoT directly controls this supply
by purchasing securities or foreign exchange from the banks when it wants to
expand reserve money and selling securities or foreign exchange when it
wants to contract reserve money. Net purchases inject liquidity, shifting the
curve to the left; net sales withdraw liquidity, shifting it to the right. Because
the interbank market clears at a net inter-bank trade of zero, the resulting
interbank interest rate is given by the intersection of the demand curve with
the vertical axis. Net injections reduce the interbank rate, other things equal,
while net withdrawals (often referred to as 'mopping up') increase it.
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Figure 11.6. An interbank market with and without standing facilities
Note: Given the position of the demand curve for liquidity, the equilibrium is at i in a system
without standing facilities and at point 1 when standing facilities are in operation.

What this implies is that a system that prioritizes a sequence of reservemoney targets must accept the resulting path of short-term interest rates. This
may in fact be one of the main virtues of reserve-money targeting in a
situation where the monetary authority wants to adopt a very tight stance—
for example, in a disinflation where the key objective is to achieve a shift in
inflation expectations. The quantity target provides the central bank with
political cover for a policy that will create very high interest rates, with
attendant costs to borrowers and potentially severe impacts on aggregate
demand. But when expectations are reasonably anchored, a system that forces
overall bank liquidity onto a predetermined path can create damaging vola
tility in short-term interest rates. This volatility emerges when shifts in port
folio preferences or bank behaviour create unanticipated movements in the
net demand for liquidity by banks (in equation (11.1), these shifts produce
forecast errors in the growth rates of velocity and/or the money multiplier).
The key feature of RMT is that does not accommodate such shifts until after
the fact, and possibly after an extended period of debate and inaction during
which the stance of monetary policy is unintendedly loose or tight.
A policy-rate system, by contrast—one in which the BoT determines (and
communicates) the stance of monetary policy as a target level of some key
short-term interest rate—automatically accommodates shocks to velocity and
the money multiplier. Figure 11.6 illustrates the role of open-market oper
ations and the potential role of standing facilities in such a system. To keep
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the interbank rate near the poliq^ rate ip, the BoT would have to forecast the
total demand for interbank liquidity at this rate, and use open-market oper
ations to nudge that demand close to zero. In Figure 11.6 this would require a
net injection of liquidity, to shift the demand curve to the left and bring the
interbank rate down towards the target. These operations could be comple
mented by the use of standing facilities—a deposit facility that allowed banks
to deposit any amount at the BoT, and receive an interest rate below the policy
rate, and a borrowing facility that allowed banks to borrow overnight from the
BoT, at a rate above the policy rate. If conditions in the interbank market were
as shown in Figure 11.6 (net of the BoT's open-market operations),^® the
interbank market would clear at a rate very close to
with banks satisfying
their excess demand at the standing borrowing facility.
In the process of steering short-term interest rates, the BoT would lose
control over the supply of bank reserves, which would respond endogenously
to the demand for reserves via the BoT's open-market operations and any
transactions at the standing facilities. Monetary aggregates could of course
serve as information variables, with unusual behaviour of reserve money or
broader aggregates leading to possible revisions in the policy rate.

11.3.2 Improving Transparency
Because wage- and price-setting is a forward-looking process, the management
of inflation expectations is a central task of monetary policy (Woodford,
2003). The disadvantages of monetary aggregates from this perspective have
become clearer as central banks have increased their focus on price stability
and placed greater emphasis on communication with the public. By contrast
with a broad monetary aggregate, inflation is a widely understood concept
that is readily observable as an intermediate target and (by definition) directly
related to the objective of price stability. A similar point applies to the choice
of operational target. Few people understand and follow reserve money, and
despite the simplicity of equation (11.1) the empirical links between reserve
money and inflation are complex. Short-term interest rates, by contrast, are
easily observed and interpreted, and their relevance to the private spending
decisions of firms and households are widely understood.

11.3.3 Strengthening Policy Transmission and Fostering
Financial Development

In well-developed financial markets, the impact of interest-rate volatility oper
ates through aggregate demand, as in the classic analysis by Poole (1970). But
when financial markets are less developed, a set of new considerations become
important. First, the transmission of short-term interest rates into longer-term
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rates and aggregate demand tends to be weak (Mishra et al., 2014), suggesting
that conventional concerns about the demand-side effects of interest-rate
volatility may be overstated. Second and by the same token, the absence of a
reliable transmission mechanism from monetary policy to aggregate demand
may appear to limit the scope for virtually any discretionary demand manage
ment by the central bank—while in reality its main impact may be to encour
age the continued use of direct, quantity-based interventions that impose
high costs on the banking system. Finally, the impact of interest rate volatility
and direct interventions on banking-sector development gives rise to a link
between the monetary framework and long-run growth that is largely absent
in advanced economies.
Taken together, these arguments suggest that the RMT framework may be
less well adapted to an environment of rapid financial-sector innovation and
economic transformation than it has been to the conquest of fiscal dominance
and the establishment of a credible monetary-policy anchor for inflation.
The common thread in these concerns is apparent in Figure 11.7—which
shows the high volatility of short-term interest rates in Tanzania and their
limited pass-through into bank deposit and lending rates^^—and Figure 11.8,
which uses a rough measure of pass-through to compare Tanzania with other
countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Figure 11.8 shows the year-by-year
ratios of the standard deviation of monthly bank loan rates to the standard
deviation of monthly short-term T-bill rates. Higher values of this index are

Figure 11.7. Interest rates and monetary transmission in Tanzania
Source: Bank of Tanzania.
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Figure 11.8. Volatility of monthly interest rates: Tanzania vs. nine other SSA
Note: this figure includes all countries with in SSA with available data (Cape Verde, Kenya, Malawi,
Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia), except the CFA coun
tries and non-South African members of the Rand Monetary Area.
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics online.

associated with stronger pass-through of short-term to long-term interest
rates. Tanzania's ratio is consistently below the median for twelve comparator
countries with available data, and far below the average for these countries.^”
The weak pass-through in Figures 11.7 and 11.8 is consistent with broader
difficulties empirical researchers have encountered in uncovering evidence of
strong and systematic transmission from monetary policy actions to desired
impacts on the Tanzanian economy (Davoodi etal., 2013; Montiel etal.,
2012). In substantial part, these difficulties reflect the limitations of conven
tional methods in a data-poor environment subject to ongoing financial
innovation and frequent supply shocks (Li et al., 2016). But even by compari
son with Kenya and Uganda, where policy makers have operated within
broadly similar RMT-style frameworks, evidence of conventional transmission
from short-term interest rates to inflation and GDP growth appears to be more
difficult to detect in Tanzania using standard macroeconomic models and
econometric approaches (Goncalves, 2015).
Figure 11.7 suggests that despite the challenges of discovering the transmis
sion mechanism from the data, the BoT can exert a powerful influence on
economic conditions when it implements a clear change in its policy stance.
Drawing on Berg etal. (2013), the figure shows the impact of the concerted
monetary tightening by the central banks of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in
October of 2011. Short-mn rates rise sharply in Tanzania, and there is a modest
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but perceptible pass-through to deposit rates. Lending rates hardly hudge,
consistent with the apparent absence of conventional transmission through
the term stmcture of interest rates. But consistent with bank-level evidence in
Tanzania (Mbowe, 2012), lending volumes respond strongly to the tightening.
Berg et al. (2013) also document a tum-around in exchange-rate depreciation—
the main focus of the intervention—and inflation, the reversal of which is
evident in Figure 11.5 in this chapter.
Monetary policy can therefore exert strong leverage over inflation in Tanzania,
and the BoT's willingness to do so when necessary has helped to establish an
effective monetary-policy anchor for private-sector expectations—an out
come made possible by the relative absence of fiscal dominance since the
mid-1990s, but by no means guaranteed. Financial-sector development—a
key secondary objective of the BoT—has proceeded rapidly in key respects,
including declines in interest-rate spreads and increases in the ratio of claims
on the private sector to overall deposits (Figure 11.9).^^ But the policy envir
onment remains one of high interest-rate volatility, limited transparency, and
occasional recourse—^particular at moments of clear policy action—to direct
interventions. The behaviour of banks will of course reflect the environment

CPS = Credit to the Private Sector from deposit money banks.

Figure 11.9. Financial deepening: Tanzania vs. Other SSA
Note: this figure excludes the CFA countries and non-South African members of the Rand Monetary
Area, but includes all other countries in SSA with available data (Angola, Botswana, Bumndi, Cabo
Verde, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozam
bique, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda,
and Zambia).
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics online.
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within which they operate, including any systematic features of the BoT's
policy framework. If volatile overnight rates are a consequence of RMT, bank
behaviour will adjust to this volatility. Large excess reserves, for example, have
been a feature of Tanzania’s banking sector throughout the RMT era, and have
been associated in cross-country work with a weakening of the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy (Saxegaard, 2006). These reserves may in part
reflect self-protection against episodes of very high interbank rates. Volatility
of short-term rates can also weaken the transmission of short-term interest
rates into the longer-term rates that matter more directly for lending and
aggregate demand (Woodford, 2003).
We emphasized in Section 11.2 that one of the continuing rationales for
RMT has been the rudimentary nature of the financial sector. Figure 11.9
suggests that after an initial decade of very rapid expansion in the wake of
banking-sector privatization and the mid-1990s accord, the pace of financial
deepening has slowed considerably over the past decade in Tanzania, relative
to that among comparator countries in SSA. In our view, this constitutes a
final—and admittedly speculative—argument in favour of transition towards
a policy-rate system. Particularly in an environment of ongoing financialsector innovation and rapidly increasing financial inclusion, a system that
stabilizes interest rates is likely to provide stronger encouragement for devel
opment of the banking sector, while simultaneously preserving and even
strengthening the BoT's ability to conduct discretionary policy.

11.4 Emerging Issues in Tanzanian Monetary Policy
We close by briefly addressing a set of emerging issues that will shape both the
BoT's policy framework and the conduct of policy within that framework. We
focus in turn on achieving East African Monetary Union (EAMU) convergence,
retaining policy independence, and accommodating the natural gas sector.
11.4.1 Achieving EAMU Convergence
The convergence process towards East African Monetary Union—^with full
convergence by 2023 at the earliest—both confirms and accelerates the direc
tion of travel laid out in this chapter. In contrast to the Eurozone, East Africa's
convergence process is unlikely to involve exchange-rate commitments
except perhaps over a final period of a few months before union, when
members may elect to adopt a fixed grid of internal rates. A union-wide central
bank, in turn, is virtually certain to reflect the practices of its largest members
by adopting a version of inflation targeting and operationalizing it using
a policy rate system. The developments discussed so far therefore place
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Tanzania's framework on a course of convergence towards the eventual
union-wide framework.
In the meantime, an EAMU-driven process of financial-sector harmoniza
tion is already altering the BoT's operating environment by shaping the set of
relevant policy instmments and altering the BoT's exposure to portfolio
shocks. The harmonization of reserve requirements, for example, narrows
the set of policy instmments by limiting the BoT's recourse to (already very
intermittent) changes in reserve requirements—appropriately, as we argued
earlier. The opening of Tanzania's capital account is likely to increase the
mobility of short-term capital, a development that will heighten the disad
vantages of RMT by transmitting interest-rate volatility more strongly into
exchange rates. These considerations add further impetus to Tanzania's shift
towards a policy rate system.

11.4.2 Retaining Policy Independence
We have emphasized the cmcial importance of the mid-1990s accord in
overcoming fiscal dominance and thereby allowing the establishment of a
monetary-policy anchor for inflation. Two concerns will have to be navigated
if the BoT is to retain the appropriate degree of independence from the fiscal
authorities. One is that a policy-rate system forces the monetary authority to
take transparent responsibility for the level of short-term interest rates. Even
in the absence of direct pressures for monetary finance, a period of fiscal
indiscipline can put the central bank into the difficult political position of
having to set a very high policy rate in order to avoid inflationary finance of
the deficit. To be able to do so effectively requires a political consensus that
supports the continued pursuit of an inflation target—and places the burden
of adjustment on the fiscal authorities—even when high interest rates are
doing clear short-term damage to both private and public borrowers.
The fundamental point is that debt sustainability is a fiscal responsibility.
Monetary policy cannot be expected to keep interest rates low in real terms,
and attempting to do so when the fiscal accounts are out of control leads to
the loss of the inflation anchor. Even formal commitments to inflation tar
geting are no rescue in such a situation, as illustrated forcefully by Ghana's
experience since 2011. Such commitments must be backed by a fiscal policy
that can be sustained without excessive monetary finance. Retaining policy
independence therefore requires continued recognition that the fiscal/mon
etary accord achieved in the mid-1990s was crucial to the two subsequent
decades of macroeconomic stability.
The second concern is more subtle and relates to the BoT's capacity to
handle the budgetary costs of managing monetary policy. Central banks
have a monopoly on the currency issue, and more broadly on the issuance
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of reserve money. The BoT must absorb the costs of producing currency, but
neither currency nor (at present) bank reserves pay interest. The BoT is there
fore typically in the position of earning net profits, because the interest on its
assets—foreign-exchange reserves, and government securities—is more than
enough to cover salaries and other operating costs. These profits are trans
ferred to the government's budget after due provision for maintaining the
BoT's capital and other financial buffers.
Central banks cannot go bankrupt, but profits can become negative when
balance-sheet trends sharply reduce net interest earnings. In such a situation,
the BoT's financial health may become the subject of public concerns, and the
BoT itself may be subject to scrutiny regarding its financial management.
Despite the explicit provision for recapitalization in the BoT Act of 2006, the
danger is that concerns about profitability will exert an undue influence on
the BoT's monetary policy stance. A looming example relates to the BoT's
agreements under EAMU and the Southern Africa Development Community
(SADC), which require convergence to much higher levels of gross official
reserves—4.5 months of imports in the case of EAMU and 6 months of
imports for SADC. Reconciling a substantial build-up of foreign-exchange
reserves with low inflation is likely to require a shift in the composition of
the BoT's balance sheet, with the additional reserves financed through costly
domestic liabilities rather than reserve money. The resulting budgetary pres
sures call for a well-defined framework of liquidity-management cost sharing
with the government.

11.4.3 Accommodating the Natural Gas Sector
Tanzania may soon be receiving large foreign direct investment inflows to
support the development of offshore deep-water natural gas. The projects
under consideration involve both upstream (extraction) and downstream
(pipeline and processing and liquefaction) components, and will generate
well over twenty-five years of natural gas production for domestic consump
tion and exports. Government revenues will increase substantially once
exports are underway, in the form of income taxes, royalties, production
sharing, and government equity participation (see Chapters, this volume).
Changes in world energy prices will generate volatility in export revenues,
with implications for foreign exchange markets both directly and via potential
linkages to foreign creditworthiness and capital flows.
The main macroeconomic issues associated with the gas economy are fiscal
rather than monetary: the Government must convert a large and persistent
increase in its spending power into a sustainable increase in the well-being of
the private sector. The most important responsibility of monetary policy is in
fact to be clear that it is fiscal policy that matters most of all. This includes
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underscoring the need for sustainable debt accumulation and emphasizing
the dangers of a pro-cyclical spending response to fluctuations in natural gas
prices. As a centre of high-quality economic research, the central bank is in a
unique position to contribute to debates on best practices and to monitor the
implications of ongoing fiscal management.
Two monetary policy issues, however, will occupy the BoT as the gas
economy expands. The first is responding (or not) to the wealth effect of
the resource discovery. Even in the face of a prudent public spending
response, a substantial increase in the economy's net external wealth means
higher sustainable consumption spending. This is likely to produce a modest
and long-lasting real appreciation relative to what would have occurred
without the resource discovery. Attempts to peg the real exchange rate at its
pre-discovery level are unlikely to be successful; a policy of resisting nominal
appreciation, for example, would tend to generate either domestic inflation
or—holding fast to inflation targets—a contractionary bias in monetary policy
(Calvo, Reinhart, and Vegh, 1995).
To the degree that spending is front-loaded and has a high domestic com
ponent, the short-run appreciation that would occur under a passive exchange
rate policy during the development and early production phases is likely to be
considerably larger than the real appreciation that is ultimately required to
absorb the economy's increased spending power. Managing this potential
overshooting requires an empirical assessment of the appropriate long-run
appreciation—as a benchmark—and a judgement regarding the costs of a large
and ultimately temporary real appreciation relative to this benchmark.
The major challenges for monetary policy, however, will emerge once
exports are underway, and have to do with managing the volatility in global
energy prices. The macroeconomic management of commodity-price volatil
ity has been the subject of a voluminous literature—see Frankel (2012) and
IMF (2012). For a given ex ante exposure to shocks, a distinction can be made
between policies that improve risk-sharing with external partners (e.g.,
denomination of debt contracts in gas), fiscal rules designed to smooth spend
ing and ensure debt sustainability in the face of shocks, and monetary policy
mles that target an appropriate balance of volatility in inflation and real
GDP. We focus here on the response of monetary policy to volatility in export
revenues.
The literature on managing external shocks has focused largely on the
merits of alternative degrees of exchange rate flexibility. A time-honoured
result states that when domestic prices are sticky, floating exchange rates
allow for efficient macroeconomic adjustment to shocks that call for a change
in the real exchange rate. An example is a shock to commodity export prices: a
favourable shock increases the spending power of a commodity-exporting
economy, and calls for a real appreciation to induce the appropriate
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production shift towards non-traded goods. A floating nominal exchange rate
accomplishes this more quickly and at lower macroeconomic cost than a peg.
Inflation-targeting frameworks tend to incorporate a substantial degree of
exchange-rate flexibility, because the nominal anchor in the system is infla
tion rather than the exchange rate. The appropriate measure of inflation may
differ, however, for a country subject to large swings in export prices. The
reason is that an inflation-targeting central bank will tend to react indirectly—
and possibly inappropriately—to commodity prices, via their impact on the
nominal exchange rate. Thus a boom in export prices generates nominal
appreciation, which tends (other things equal) to reduce inflation. A strict
inflation targeter pushes back, by lowering interest rates in order to expand
aggregate demand. But the boom has already expanded aggregate demand, to
a degree that combines the fiscal response with any increase in the commodity
sector's demand for domestically produced inputs. If spending on domestic
output is already procyclical with the export price, a procyclical monetary
easing may create excessive volatility in the real economy (Lama and Medina,
2012; Ferrero and Seneca, 2015). A good fiscal rule can soften this conflict very
considerably, by generating a more neutral spending response. But an
inflation-targeting rule that uses domestic price inflation rather than the CPI
inflation may also have a favourable impact, by down-weighting the nomi
nal exchange rate and avoiding excessive real-side volatility in the face of
commodity price fluctuations.
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Appendix
Table 11 A.1. Aspects of the legislative mandate of the Bank of Tanzania
Bank of
Tanzania Act

Objectives of Monetary Policy

Provisions on Non-Financial
Relationship to Fiscal Authorities

1965

61 .-(1) The Bank may advise the
5.-(1) The principal functions of the Bank
shall be to exercise the functions of a
Government on any matter
relating to its functions, powers
central bank, and, without prejudice to
and duties under this or any other
the generality of the foregoing, to issue
law and shall advise the
currency, to regulate banking and credit,
Government when, in the Bank's
to manage the gold and foreign exchange
opinion, any such matter is likely
reserves of Tanzania, and to perform any
to affect the achievement of the
function conferred upon it (or to act as the
principal objectives of the Bank as
agent of the Government in respect of any
set forth in section 5.
function conferred on the Government)
by or under any international agreement 61 .-(2) The Government may
require the Bank to give its advice
to which Tanzania is a party.
on any matter relating to the
5.-(2) Within the context of the economic
functions, powers and duties of
policy of the Government, the activities of
the Bank and credit conditions in
the Bank shall be directed to the
Tanzania or any proposals,
promotion of credit and exchange
measures or transactions relating
conditions conducive to the rapid growth
thereto, and the Bank shall give its
of the national economy of Tanzania, due
advice accordingly.
regard being had to the desirability of
fostering monetary stability.

1978
Amendment

S.-(2) [... ] due regard being had to the
desirability of fostering domestic and
external monetary stability.
5.-(3) Subject to sections (1) and (2) of this
document, the Bank shall engage in the
promotion of rural development,
industrial and agricultural production and
the development of such other sectors of
the economy of Tanzania as the Bank may
deem appropriate. The Bank shall carry
out its functions under this subsection
through, amongst other ways—
(a) the provision of financial facilities, under
such terms and conditions as the Bank
may determine, to banks and designated
financial institutions engaged in the
financing of the economic sectors referred
to in this subsection;
(b) the guaranteeing, through funds created
under Section 46B, of loans, investments
or advances made available by banks and
other designated financial institutions
engaged in the financing of the economic
sectors referred to in this subsection;
(c) the provision of training facilities or
opportunities designed to promote the
development of a system of sound
financial management in Tanzania;

(continued)
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Table 11A.1.
Bank of
Tanzania Act

1995

2006

Continued
Objectives of Monetary Policy

(d) the supervision and inspection of the
activities of banks and specified financial
institutions.
5.-(1) The principal functions of the Bank
shall be to exercise the functions of a
central bank and, without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing, to formulate,
implement and be responsible for
monetary policy, to issue currency, to
regulate and supervise banks and financial
institutions and to manage gold and
foreign exchange reserves of Tanzania.
5.-(2) The Bank shall promote sound
monetary, credit and banking conditions
conducive to the development of the
economy of Tanzania.
5.-(3) The primary objective of the Bank
shall be to formulate and implement
monetary policy directed to the economic
objective of maintaining price stability
conducive to a balanced and sustainable
growth of the national economy of
Tanzania.
5.-(4) Without prejudice to its primary
objective as stated above, the Bank shall
support the general economic policy of
the Governments.
7.-(1) The primary objective of the Bank
shall be to formulate, define and
implement monetary policy directed to
the economic objective of maintaining
domestic price stability conducive to a
balanced and sustainable growth of the
national economy.
7.-(2) Without prejudice to subsection (1),
the Bank shall ensure the integrity of the
financial system and support the general
economic policy of the Government and
promote sound monetary, credit and
banking conditions conducive to the
development of the national economy.

Provisions on Non-Financial
Relationship to Fiscal Authorities

7.-(1) There shall be regularly held
consultations between the
Governments and the Governor
on monetary policy,
7.-(2) In the event of fundamental
and irreconcilable differences
between the Minister and the
Governor over monetary policy,
the Minister shall by Order
published in the Gazette direct the
Governor to formulate and
implement monetary policy along
the position of the Minister for a
period not exceeding twelve
months or any other period as
shall be specified in the Order,
7.-(3) Except as provided herein
above nothing in this section shall
be construed as to limit or affect
the obligation of the Bank to carry
out its primary objective,

7.-(3) The Minister and the
Governor shall, where
circumstances require, consult
each other with a view to
exchanging information and
seeking coordination on
economic and financial matters.
There is no counterpart in the BoT
Act of 2006 to Section 7.-<2) of
the BoT Act of 1995.

Sources: Government of Tanzania, BoT Acts of 1965,1995, and 2006, and 1978 Amendment to the BoT Act of 1965.
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Notes
1. See Kaufmann and O'Connell (1997) on the quasi-fiscal implications of the exchangecontrol system in Tanzania, and Collier and Gunning (1991) on the quasi-fiscal
implications of financial repression in Tanzania's socialist banking system.
2. See Mpango (2002) on Tanzania's experience with the cash budget. Cash budgets
also played an important role in Uganda (Kasekende and Hussain, 2000) and
Zambia (Adam and Bevan, 2000) during the 1990s.
3. The US Fed famously adopted a variant of reserve-money targeting (focused on what
the Fed defined as non-borrowed reserves) at the outset of the Volcker disinflation
in 1979.
4. The BoT has recently begun to take on many elements of IT, and we will focus on
this ongoing transition in Section 11.3.
5. The former approach implies allowing elements of its balance sheet to adjust as
may be required to keep the interest rate close to its target; the latter allows short
term interest rates to adjust. The US Fed used a short-term interest rate target to
pursue broad monetary aggregates during episodes in the 1970s and 1980s.
6. The financial programming model was designed to guide monetary and fiscal
policy when balance-sheet data were available from the banking sector but a dearth
of real-time information about the state of the economy limited the scope for finetuning the government's efforts to achieve economic stabilization (Polak, 1957).
7. This language is from the BoT Act of 2006 but is virtually identical with section 5.3
of the BoT Act of 1995, which represented a major departure from the 1978
Amendment to the BoT Act of 1965.
8. In contemporary monetary policy analysis, price stability is usually interpreted as a
low and stable rate of expected inflation—a situation in which expectations are
anchored in the sense that wage- and price-setters view shocks to inflation as tem
porary. Inflation itself may be variable, but around a constant and low medium-term
average.
9. The differences between headline and core inflation are striking in Figure 11.2b:
there are only two years out of twenty in which core exceeds headline, suggesting
that food and energy prices (taken together) have been rising in real terms over the
entire twenty-year period.
10. The adjusted gap allows for a distinction between the programme ceiling and the
implicit target of BoT behaviour and policy dialogue between the BoT and the
IMF. In July 2007 reserve-money programme targets were redefined as applying to
average reserve money in the final month of each quarter, rather than to reserve
money on the final day; and rather than a single ceiling, a narrow target range was
specified. The targets used in the regressions are the actual programme targets
before July 2007, and the upper bound of the target range starting in July 2007.
In Figure 11.5, these changes coincide with an apparent change both in the vola
tility of the gap—which the move to a monthly average was intended to reduce—
and the average level of the gap.
11. The logs of these two variables are non-stationary, but they share a common
random walk component or stochastic trend. We cannot reject the hypothesis
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12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.
20.

21.

that the gap between the two variables is stationary, and we can only marginally
reject the hypothesis that the cointegrating vector relating the two variables is [1 -1],
Given the theoretical appeal of this restriction and the short data sample, we
impose this restriction on the data and therefore estimate the error-correction
equations using the gap as the lagged equilibrium error.
The statement that Granger causality mns in both directions means that each of
these variables helps to predict the other, conditional on the other variable's lagged
values.
There is weaker evidence of asymmetry on the reserve-money side, but columns 3
and 7 suggest that adjustment was faster when reserves were below the ceiling than
when they were above.
Portillo etal. (2016) note that food prices are considerably more flexible than
non-food prices. They show that in a low-income economy with a large foodproduction sector that is subject to droughts and other supply shocks, the optimal
inflation objective may be to stabilize non-food rather than headline inflation. The
reason for this is that stabilizing headline inflation creates excessive volatility in
inflation and output in the non-food sector.
Examples include the July 2007 adjustment in how reserve-money targets were
calculated, the accommodation of quarterly real GDP data since 2010, and current
discussions of improving policy responsiveness by elevating the informational role
of free reserves (bank deposits at the BoT in excess of the statutory minimum) in
the BoT's internal deliberations.
The classic analysis is Poole (1970), who focused on the markets for broad
monetary aggregates and government securities. In a well-functioning financial
market, the short-term rates determined in the interbank market feed through to
the longer-term rates emphasized by Poole—an issue we address further in
Section 11.3.3.
The BoT is of course alert to this concern, and pays attention to movements in
exchange rates and market interest rates when deciding on monthly reservemoney targets. It also stands ready to alter liquidity conditions through direct
interventions that include changes in reserve requirements or foreign exchange
cover requirements.
The demand for liquidity by banks will depend on the BoT's operating procedures
and on the presence or absence of standing facilities. There is therefore no pre
sumption that the position of the demand curve in Figure 11.6 is independent of
the policy framework.
Interbank interest rates are not shown in Figure 11.7 but are even more volatile
than the repo rate (on short-maturity repurchase agreements by the BoT).
The financial-sector comparisons in this section are based on publicly available IMF
data and use all countries in sub-Saharan Africa with available data, with the
exception of countries in the CFA franc zone and non-South African members of
the Rand Monetary Area. We exclude these countries because they are on fixed
exchange rate systems.
The average monthly interest-rate spread in Tanzania (overall lending rate minus
overall deposit rate) fell from 12.8 percentage points in 2000-04 to 6.9 in 2010-14,
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and is now below the median for eighteen comparator countries in sub-Saharan
Africa (this group excludes the CFA zone and non-South African members of the
Rand Monetary Area). The median spread among the comparator countries fell
from 11.1 to 8.8 percentage points for the same periods.
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